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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 11-3917 
_____________ 
 
MARTIN GROSS, Individually and t/d/b/a The Art I Do, 
                                      Appellant, 
v. 
 
R.T. REYNOLDS, INC.; HARRISBURG UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE AND 
TECHNOLOGY; D.E. GIMMELL, INC.; GRAYSTONE BANK; IKE SHOLLEY; 
WAYNE SPAHR; RON WHISKER; TODD BUZARD; ERIC DARR;  
DELLANOR YOUNG; DAVE ANGLE, 
      Appellees. 
_______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. No. 10-cv-2380) 
District Judge:  Hon. Lawrence F. Stengel  
_______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
June 29, 2012 
 
Before:   SLOVITER, CHAGARES, and JORDAN, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: July 6, 2012) 
 _______________ 
 
 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 _______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 Martin Gross appeals the order of the United States District Court for the Middle 
District of Pennsylvania dismissing his civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 
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1983, as well as his state law claims alleging breach of contract and breach of the duty of 
good faith and fair dealing.  Although Gross‟s Amended Complaint fails to satisfy the 
pleading standards set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, we will remand to 
allow the District Court to determine in the first instance whether it should grant Gross 
leave to further amend, or whether such amendment would be futile or inequitable. 
I. Background  
 A. Facts
1
 
 Defendant Harrisburg University of Science and Technology (“the University”) is 
a private institution registered with the Pennsylvania Department of Education.  It 
receives public funding and is subject to state and federal regulation.  Defendant Eric 
Darr is the President of the University.  Defendant R.T. Reynolds, Inc. (“Reynolds”) is a 
Pennsylvania corporation and the general contractor for a construction project at the 
University.  Defendants Ike Sholley, Wayne Spahr, Ron Whisker, Todd Buzard, and 
Dave Angle are Reynolds‟s officers, employees, or agents.  The University‟s construction 
project “received extensive federal, state, and/or local funding, was subject to public 
procurement requirements and standards, and reporting requirements, including … 
                                              
1
 In reviewing a district court‟s decision to grant a motion to dismiss under Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), we “accept as true all well-pled factual allegations in 
the complaint, and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.”  Marcavage v. 
Nat’l Park Serv., 666 F.3d 856, 858 (3d Cir. 2012). 
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[reporting pertinent to] the City of Harrisburg‟s disadvantaged business program for 
minority and women owned businesses.”2  (Amend. Compl. ¶ 13.)   
 Gross (doing business as “The Art I Do”3) and his colleague James White, both of 
whom are African-American, submitted a proposal to Reynolds to perform painting in 
connection with Reynolds‟s construction work at the University.  Defendants Whisker 
and Spahr allegedly solicited Gross to work on the construction project, negotiated with 
him on behalf of Reynolds, and were “involved in the contract management matters 
throughout the performance of the contract.”  (Amend. Compl. ¶ 17.)   
 According to Gross, Reynolds was initially apprehensive about doing business 
with him and White, based on its past dealings with them.  Specifically, Reynolds was 
hesitant to work with Gross and White because it had worked with them on a mold-
abatement project in 2005 and, during that project, Gross and White had “refused to 
become complicit in an effort to conceal the … scope of the mold problem.” (Id. ¶ 22.)  
As Gross tells it, when he and White refused to conceal that problem, “Reynolds was 
forced to make significant additional expenditures” on the 2005 project.  (Id.)   
 Despite Reynolds‟s initial hesitance, however, it entered a subcontracting 
agreement with Gross and White on May 7, 2007.  Reynolds hired Dellanor Young, a 
consultant, to oversee “the disadvantaged business provisions of … [that] contract.”  (Id. 
                                              
2
 Under the City of Harrisburg‟s (“the City”) disadvantaged business program, 
contractors who submitted bids for general construction projects in the City received 
points for soliciting and using businesses owned by minorities and women.   
3
 The Amended Complaint alleges that The Art I Do is a certified disadvantaged 
business under the City‟s disadvantaged business program.  
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¶ 15.)  Under the agreement,
4
 Gross and White promised to provide Reynolds with 
painting services.  The agreement also stated that Reynolds could reduce the scope of 
Gross‟s duties under the contract and require Gross to subcontract with other vendors to 
perform some of his contractual duties.  It also provided that Reynolds was not 
responsible for any unexpected delays in the construction project.  Gross claims that the 
agreement also required him to secure financing from Defendant Graystone Bank 
(“Graystone”), to ensure that The Art I Do could satisfy its payroll expenses and other 
costs associated with performing under the contract while Reynolds was in the process of 
making payments.  Gross alleges that, unlike other similarly situated non-minority 
contractors who entered into financing agreements with Graystone, he was required “to 
grant Graystone a mortgage on [his] personal residence … .”  (Id. ¶ 37.)     
 Gross points to a series of events during the formation and performance of the 
agreement which, according to him, demonstrate that Reynolds intended to discriminate 
against him on the basis of race.  First, he claims that, at the time he executed the 
agreement with Reynolds, “Reynolds knew that it would not perform certain aspects of 
[the] contract … but proceeded to” execute the agreement in order to enhance its position 
in the bidding process for construction work at the University.  (Id. ¶ 19.)  Second, he 
                                              
4
 Although Gross did not attach a copy of the agreement to the Amended 
Complaint, Reynolds attached a copy of it to its motions to dismiss.  Because there is no 
dispute as to the authenticity of the agreement, and the precise terms are integral to our 
analysis, we may consider it in assessing the merits of Gross‟s appeal.  See Pension 
Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993) 
(“We … hold that a court may consider an undisputedly authentic document that a 
defendant attaches as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff‟s claims are based 
on the document.”). 
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claims that “[e]arly in the performance of the contract, it became apparent that work 
delays would not permit [Reynolds] to be able to commence and end its work as 
contemplated by the contract”  (id. ¶ 24), and that Reynolds‟s employees “sabotaged” his 
work schedule “by showing favoritism and granting preferences to other non-minority 
contractors.”  (Id. ¶ 33.)  Third, he alleges that, although his duties under the agreement 
included installing wood veneer in a building at the University, “Reynolds arbitrarily 
decided to remove the veneer job from the scope of [Gross‟s] work … and to give it to 
another contractor … .”  (Id. ¶ 39.)  Fourth, Gross alleges that, on January 17, 2008, Ike 
Sholley, a Reynolds employee, sent him a letter demanding that he remove White from 
the University construction project, and that Sholley made that demand for 
“discriminatory and retaliatory reasons[] relating to Mr. White‟s race … .”  (Id. ¶ 28.)  
Finally, Gross claims that Reynolds demonstrated its “favoritism … to … non-minority 
contractors,” by selecting D.E. Gimmell, Inc. (“Gimmell”), another subcontractor, to 
perform parking lot line painting for the construction project even though he originally 
bid on that work, and that Reynolds required him to compensate Gemmill when it 
completed the painting.  (Id. ¶ 33.)   
 On several occasions, White complained to Reynolds or the University about the 
allegedly discriminatory behavior of Reynolds and its employees.  In early 2008, White 
wrote a letter to an official at the University complaining that minority contractors 
received unequal treatment during the performance of their duties in connection with the 
construction project at the University, and Gross made several written and oral 
complaints to Reynolds about the work delays.  Although those letters and complaints did 
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not fix his predicament with Reynolds and its employees, Gross alleges that his working 
relationship with the company improved in March 2008, after he hired a non-minority 
foreman.   
 Gross asserts that, although he completed all of his contractual obligations by 
April 2009, Reynolds failed to pay him from $88,000 to $120,000 it owed him under the 
terms of the agreement.
5
   
 B. Procedural History 
 Based on the conduct described above, Gross initiated this lawsuit against 
Reynolds, the University, Darr, Young, Graystone, Gimmell, Sholley, Spahr, Whisker, 
Buzard, and Angle (collectively, “Defendants”), asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 1981 and 1983, as well as state law claims of breach of contract and breach of the 
implied duty of good faith and fair dealing.  All Defendants moved to dismiss the 
Amended Complaint.  On September 22, 2011, the District Court issued an opinion and 
order dismissing Gross‟s federal claims against each of the Defendants.6  Having 
dismissed the federal claims, the Court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction 
over Gross‟s state law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).     
 This timely appeal followed.  
                                              
5
 Although the Amended Complaint states that Reynolds failed to “Reynolds is … 
obligated to pay the Art I Do … $88,000 - $120,000,” (Amend. Compl. ¶ 50), Gross‟s 
appellate brief states that “Reynolds is … obligated to pay the Art I Do … $90,000,” 
(Appellant‟s Br. at 12.) 
6
 The District Court also dismissed Eloise Gross as a Plaintiff.  We affirm that 
dismissal as the Amended Complaint contains no allegations indicating that Eloise Gross 
was involved in any of the transactions or occurrences giving rise to this lawsuit. 
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II. Discussion
7
  
 On appeal, Gross argues that the District Court erred by dismissing the Amended 
Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).  Our review of that 
decision is plenary.  Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 206 (3d Cir. 2009).  We 
take as true all the factual allegations in the Amended Complaint and the reasonable 
inferences that can be drawn from those facts, Sheridan v. NGK Metals Corp., 609 F.3d 
239, 262 n.27 (3d Cir. 2010), but we disregard legal conclusions and “[t]hreadbare 
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,” 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).  “To survive a motion to dismiss, a 
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief 
that is plausible on its face.”  Sheridan, 609 F.3d at 262 n.27 (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted).  “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads 
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is 
liable for the misconduct alleged.”  Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).  
 A. Gross’s § 1981 Claims Against Reynolds and Its Employees 
 We begin by addressing Gross‟s § 1981 claims against Reynolds and its 
employees.  The District Court held that the Amended Complaint failed to allege facts 
sufficient to state a plausible § 1981 claim against any of those Defendants.  We agree. 
 Section 1981 provides that: 
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall 
have the same right in every State and Territory to make and 
                                              
7
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367.  We 
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
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enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the 
full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the 
security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white 
citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, 
penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to 
no other. 
 
42 U.S.C. § 1981(a).  To state a claim under § 1981, a party must allege facts sufficient to 
show:  “(1) [he] is a member of a racial minority; (2) intent to discriminate on the basis of 
race by the defendant; and (3) discrimination concerning one or more of the activities 
enumerated in the statute[,] which includes the right to make and enforce contracts … .”  
Brown v. Philip Morris, Inc., 250 F.3d 789, 797 (3d Cir. 2001) (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted).  
 Accepting as true the averments in the Amended Complaint, we conclude that 
Gross has failed to allege a plausible claim of intentional discrimination on the basis of 
race against Reynolds and its employees under § 1981.  While the Amended Complaint 
alleges an abundance of wrongdoing by Reynolds and its employees, it fails to allege any 
facts supporting the conclusion that those acts were motivated by discrimination on the 
basis of race.  Instead, it alleges a series of unfortunate events and then states, in 
conclusory fashion, that the reason for those events is that Reynolds harbored 
discriminatory animus towards Gross or White.  For example, Gross alleges that 
Reynolds‟s employees “sabotaged” his work schedule “by showing favoritism and 
granting preferences to other non-minority contractors,” and delayed the construction 
project.  (Amend. Compl. ¶ 33.)  However, Gross fails to allege how Reynolds treated 
non-minority contractors any differently than it treated him, or how delays in the 
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construction project were motivated by or related to Gross‟s race.8  Gross also claims that 
Sholley sent him a letter demanding that he remove White from the University 
construction project, and that Sholley did so for “discriminatory and retaliatory reasons[] 
relating to Mr. White‟s race … .”  (Id. ¶ 28.)  But, once again, Gross alleges no facts 
supporting that conclusion.  So too with Gross‟s averments that Reynolds removed the 
veneer work from the agreement and required him to retain and compensate Gemmill for 
work which Gross “originally bid on but was deleted from the scope of work.”  (Id. ¶ 42.)  
Even if that conduct constituted a breach of the agreement, Gross fails to allege facts 
supporting the inference that Reynolds took those actions for discriminatory reasons.
9
  
                                              
8
 It is not immediately apparent why the hiring of a white foreman by a minority 
subcontractor would make a racist contractor more inclined to treat the minority 
subcontractor better, but even if that were true, Rule 8 requires more than mere 
speculation.  A plaintiff must plead facts sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the 
speculative level.”  Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2009).  Thus, without 
more, the fact that Gross‟s and Reynolds‟s relationship improved after Gross hired a non-
minority foreman does not give rise to a reasonable inference that Reynolds intended to 
discriminate against Gross on the basis of race. 
9
 The agreement expressly gives Reynolds the authority to take those actions, and 
Gross fails to allege any facts suggesting that Reynolds exercised that authority for 
discriminatory reasons.  (See App. at 112 (providing “[t]he Subcontractor may be ordered 
in writing by the Contractor, without invalidating this Subcontract, to make changes in 
the Work within the general scope of this Subcontract consisting of additions, deletions 
or other revisions … .”); id. at 107 (providing that “[t]he Contractor may require the 
Subcontractor to enter into agreements with Sub-subcontractors performing portions of 
the Work of this Subcontract by which the Subcontractor and the Sub-subcontractor are 
mutually bound, to the extent of the Work to be performed by the Sub-subcontractor … 
.”).) 
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 Therefore, because the Amended Complaint fails to allege facts sufficient to state 
a plausible § 1981 claim against Reynolds and its employees, the District Court properly 
dismissed Gross‟s § 1981 claims against those defendants.10  
 B. Gross’s § 1981 Claims Against the University and Darr 
 The District Court also dismissed the § 1981 claims against the University and 
Darr because they were not parties to a contract with Gross, and the factual allegations in 
the Amended Complaint did not support a reasonable inference that they interfered with a 
contract between Reynolds and Gross.  We agree with that considered judgment. 
 Section 1981 prohibits discrimination on the basis of race in the “mak[ing] and 
enforc[ing][of] contracts.”  42 U.S.C. § 1981(b).  The statute defines the “mak[ing] and 
enforc[ing] [of] contracts” as “the making, performance, modification, and termination of 
contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the 
contractual relationship.”  Id.  Consistent with that language, the Supreme Court has held 
that “Section 1981 offers relief when racial discrimination blocks the creation of a 
contractual relationship, as well as when racial discrimination impairs an existing 
contractual relationship, so long as the plaintiff has or would have rights under the 
existing or proposed contractual relationship.”  Domino’s Pizza, Inc. v. McDonald, 546 
U.S. 470, 476 (2006).    
 Here, the Amended Complaint does not allege that Gross “has or would have 
rights under [an] existing or proposed contractual relationship” with the University or 
                                              
10
 On August 15, 2011, the District Court issued an order dismissing with 
prejudice all claims against Gemmill based on Gross‟s stipulation to that effect. 
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Darr.  Id.  Thus, in order to state a claim against the University and Darr, Gross must 
allege that they blocked him from creating a contractual relationship with Reynolds or 
another third party, or impaired a contractual relationship that existed between him and a 
third party.  The Amended Complaint contains no such allegations.  With respect to Darr, 
the Amended Complaint alleges that he “approached [Gross] and made inquiries into the 
nature of [Gross‟s] relationship with Reynolds,” and that Gross had the impression that, 
based on Darr‟s inquiries, “[he] was trying to learn things from [Gross] surreptitiously … 
.”  (Amend. Compl. ¶ 26.)  As to the University, the Amended Complaint alleges vaguely 
that, along with all of the other Defendants, it “knowingly subjected [Gross] to disparate 
treatment in the management of his subcontract because he is a minority.”  (Id. ¶ 48.)   
 None of those allegations supports a reasonable inference that, for reasons related 
to race, the University or Darr impaired the creation or performance of a contract to 
which Gross was a party.  First, the vague allegation that Darr was “trying to learn things 
surreptitiously” provides no indication that his inquiries were racially motivated or 
designed to interfere with Gross‟s contract with Reynolds.  Moreover, Gross‟s assertion 
that the University “knowingly subjected him to disparate treatment … because he is a 
minority” is nothing more than a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation, which, 
under Rule 8, is insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss.  See Baraka v. McGreevey, 
481 F.3d 187, 195 (3d Cir. 2007) (noting that on motion to dismiss court is “not 
compelled to accept unsupported conclusions and unwarranted inferences, or a legal 
conclusion couched as a factual allegation” (citations and internal quotation marks 
omitted)).  Therefore, we agree with the District Court‟s decision to dismiss Plaintiff‟s  
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§ 1981 claims against the University and Darr. 
 C. Gross’s § 1981 Claims against Young and Graystone Bank 
 We also agree with the District Court‟s determination that Gross failed to allege 
facts sufficient to state a plausible § 1981 claim against Young and Graystone.  With 
respect to Young, the Amended Complaint alleges in conclusory fashion that, although 
Young was “charged with the responsibility of monitoring the disadvantaged business 
provisions of the bid documents and the contract” (Amend. Compl. ¶ 15), she 
“knowingly worked with Reynolds to conceal the” fact that “Reynolds was failing to 
meet its commitments to [Gross] and perhaps other minority contractors,”  and did not 
“work toward contractual or extra-contractual remedies for [those] failures,” (id. ¶ 31.)  
However, as the District Court correctly noted, the Amended Complaint fails to allege 
anything Young did to conceal those problems or how she monitored the project in a 
manner that gives rise to the reasonable inference that she intended to discriminate 
against Gross on the basis of race.
11
     
 The Amended Complaint also fails to state a § 1981 lending discrimination claim 
against Graystone.  To make a prima facie lending discrimination claim, Gross must 
show 
(1) that he belongs to a protected class, (2) that he applied and 
was qualified for credit that was available from the defendant, 
(3) that his application was denied or that its approval was 
made subject to unreasonable or overly burdensome 
                                              
11
 Indeed, even assuming that Young was negligent by failing to adequately 
monitor the construction project, and concealed the fact that Reynolds failed to meet its 
contractual obligations, Gross does not allege facts supporting the inference that Young 
acted for reasons related to race. 
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conditions, and (4) that some additional evidence exists that 
establishes a causal nexus between the harm suffered and the 
plaintiff‟s membership in a protected class, from which a 
reasonable juror could infer, in light of common experience, 
that the defendant acted with discriminatory intent. 
 
Anderson v. Wachovia Mortg. Corp., 621 F.3d 261, 275 (3d Cir. 2010).  The Amended 
Complaint does not allege that Gross was qualified for an unsecured line of credit, or that 
the requirement of a mortgage on his property was unreasonable or overly burdensome.  
Moreover, Gross‟s naked assertion that Graystone did not require other similarly situated 
non-minority customers to secure their loans with a home mortgage does not suffice to 
satisfy Rule 8‟s pleading standard.  See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“Nor does a complaint 
suffice if it tenders „naked assertion[s]‟ devoid of „further factual enhancement.‟” 
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557)).  Accordingly, we agree with the District Court‟s 
conclusion that the Amended Complaint fails to state a § 1981 lending discrimination 
claim against Graystone. 
 D. Gross’s § 1983 Claims Against All Defendants 
 Finally, the District Court dismissed Gross‟s § 1983 claims based on its 
determination that the Amended Complaint failed to allege that any of the Defendants 
acted under the color of state law.  We find no error in that determination.  Section 1983 
provides that: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, 
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the 
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any 
citizen of the United States or other person within the 
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, 
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and 
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laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, 
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress … . 
 
42 U.S.C. § 1983.  It is well-settled that, “to state a claim of liability under § 1983, [the 
plaintiff] must allege that [he] was deprived of a federal constitutional or statutory right 
by a state actor.”  Leshko v. Servis, 423 F.3d 337, 339 (3d Cir. 2005). 
 That requirement is fatal to Plaintiff‟s § 1983 claim.  The Amended Complaint 
contains no facts supporting a reasonable inference that Graystone, Reynolds, Reynolds‟ 
employees, Gemmill, or Young are state actors.  With respect to the University, the 
Amended Complaint suggests that because the University “was funded in large part by 
public monies” and is subject to “state … laws governing public procurement,” it is a 
state actor under § 1983.  (Amend. Compl. at 2.)  However, a private entity does not 
become a state actor for the purpose of § 1983 simply because it is subject to state 
regulations or receives funding from the state.  See Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 
840 (1982) (holding that nonprofit, private “school‟s receipt of public funds does not 
make [its] discharge decisions acts of the State”); Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1011 
(1982) (rejecting claim that nursing home was state actor even though state subsidized 
the operating and capital costs of the nursing home facilities, paid the medical expenses 
of more than 90% of the patients in the home, and licensed the nursing home‟s facilities).  
Instead, in determining whether conduct is attributable to the state or a private entity, we 
ask “whether there is such a close nexus between the State and the challenged action that 
seemingly private behavior may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.”  Leshko, 423 
F.3d at 339 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).  Here, aside from the 
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allegations that the University receives “public monies” and is subject to state regulation, 
the Amended Complaint is devoid of any factual allegations supporting a reasonable 
inference that the University is a state actor.  And because the University is not 
adequately alleged to be a state actor, it is not subject to liability under § 1983.  Finally, 
because the University is not a state actor, and the Amended Complaint provides no 
indication that Darr is a state actor, he is not subject to liability under § 1983. 
 In sum, because the Amended Complaint fails to allege that any of the Defendants 
are state actors, the District Court appropriately dismissed Plaintiff‟s § 1983 claims.12 
 D. Leave to Amend 
 Gross also argues that the District Court erred by dismissing the Amended 
Complaint without granting him leave to amend.  That may be true, but it is difficult to 
discern what happened in the District Court in this regard.  We cannot tell from the 
parties‟ submissions what, if anything, was communicated to Gross to show either that he 
had leave to file a second amended complaint or to say that amendment would be futile.  
The District Court dismissed the Amended Complaint without commenting on whether 
the dismissal was with prejudice.  Nevertheless, the parties have treated the dismissal at 
issue here as being with prejudice, and, since the case appears to have been closed on the 
District Court‟s docket, we will treat it that way too.  
                                              
12
 Because Plaintiff does not argue that the District Court abused its discretion by 
dismissing their pendent state law claims, we do not consider that issue on appeal.  See 
Nagle v. Alspach, 8 F.3d 141, 143 (3d Cir. 1993) (noting that “[w]hen an issue is either 
not set forth in the statement of issues presented or not pursued in the argument section of 
the brief, the appellant has abandoned and waived that issue on appeal”). 
 16 
 
Under our precedent, “if a complaint is subject to a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, a 
district court must permit a curative amendment unless such an amendment would be 
inequitable or futile.”  Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 245 (3d Cir. 2008).  
Here, it appears that amendment may be futile with respect to at least some of the claims 
against some of the Defendants.  For example, Graystone asserts in its brief that Gross‟s 
claims against it are barred by the statute of limitations.  If true, that would render 
amendment futile with respect to the claims against it.  Also, the Amended Complaint 
acknowledges that the University is a “private educational institution” (Amend. Compl. 
at 2), and it is not at all clear that Gross can say anything to show that the University had 
the kind of relationship with the state that would give rise to an inference that the 
University should be considered a state actor under § 1983.  It thus may be that 
amendment of that claim as to the University and its President would be futile.   
The futility or inequitableness of amendment may affect more than those two 
examples, but we will not endeavor to determine that now.  Those are questions for the 
District Court to address in the first instance.  As we said in Phillips, “even when [a] 
plaintiff does not seek leave to amend his complaint after a defendant moves to dismiss it, 
unless the district court finds that amendment would be inequitable or futile, the court 
must inform the plaintiff that he or she has leave to amend the complaint within a set 
period of time.” 515 F.3d at 245.  The District Court does not appear to have done that 
here.  Thus, we remand for the District Court to determine and explain in the first 
instance whether leave to amend should be granted or whether further amendment would 
be futile or inequitable.  
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III. Conclusion 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate and remand. 
